Four purposes, four covenant families. (1) Leverage — debt / EBITDA ceiling, debt / capitalisation, secured-debt baskets. (2) Priority — negative pledge, restrictions on subsidiary guarantees, anti-layering, restricted-subsidiary tests. (3) Performance — interest coverage, fixed-charge coverage, minimum EBITDA, maximum capex. (4) Shareholder leakage — restricted payments (dividends, buybacks, affiliate transactions), permitted-investments basket, sale-leaseback restrictions.
| Covenant | Purpose | Risk if absent |
|---|---|---|
| Maintenance leverage test | Leverage | Borrower can lever up indefinitely; leverage drift |
| Negative pledge | Priority | Future secured creditor jumps in front of you |
| Restricted payments | Shareholder leakage | Cash flowed out to equity even as credit deteriorates |
| Interest coverage | Performance | Operating decline goes undetected until coupon is missed |
| Cross-default to bank debt | Cross-class trigger | Bank default can occur without bondholders gaining a seat |
Worked example — Pelham Holdings 7.5% senior unsecured notes due 2031. Reading the indenture by purpose: (1) Leverage — 5.0x debt / EBITDA ceiling, tested quarterly, with carve-outs for working-capital revolver draws. (2) Priority — negative pledge present but with a $200M permitted-indebtedness basket that may be drawn to secured lenders without consent. (3) Shareholder leakage — restricted payments capped at 50% of cumulative net income plus a $150M starter basket. (4) Performance — none. (5) Cross-default — to bank debt only above $50M acceleration. Practitioner read: Pelham's bondholders are protected on leverage (5.0x is generous but real), partially on priority (the $200M basket is the structural hole), well on shareholder leakage, and not at all on performance. If PFAS regulation forces $200M of incremental secured DIP-style financing, the basket is exhausted and the bond's effective seniority erodes overnight.
Covenant-lite vs covenant-heavy is a distribution, not a binary. Covenant-lite indentures (typical of large 2017-2024 leveraged-loan vintages) carry incurrence-only leverage covenants — borrower can stay outside the test as long as it does not actively borrow new debt — and small restricted-payments basket discipline. Covenant-heavy indentures (typical of distressed exchanges and middle-market direct lending) carry quarterly maintenance covenants, tighter baskets, and explicit performance tests. Spread compensation typically reflects this: cov-lite issues at 50-100bps wider than otherwise comparable cov-heavy notes during normal markets, more in stress.
Sit with the ideas.
Tirebridge Materials issues new high-yield senior unsecured notes. The indenture contains a maintenance leverage covenant (4.5x debt / EBITDA ceiling) and a restricted-payments covenant capping dividends and buybacks at 50% of cumulative net income. Negative pledge, performance covenants, and interest-coverage tests are all absent. Which conclusion best describes what the bondholder bought?