Key point
Four purposes, four covenant families. (1) Leverage — debt / EBITDA ceiling, debt / capitalisation, secured-debt baskets. (2) Priority — negative pledge, restrictions on subsidiary guarantees, anti-layering, restricted-subsidiary tests. (3) Performance — interest coverage, fixed-charge coverage, minimum EBITDA, maximum capex. (4) Shareholder leakage — restricted payments (dividends, buybacks, affiliate transactions), permitted-investments basket, sale-leaseback restrictions.
Compare
| Covenant | Purpose | Risk if absent |
|---|---|---|
| Maintenance leverage test | Leverage | Borrower can lever up indefinitely; leverage drift |
| Negative pledge | Priority | Future secured creditor jumps in front of you |
| Restricted payments | Shareholder leakage | Cash flowed out to equity even as credit deteriorates |
| Interest coverage | Performance | Operating decline goes undetected until coupon is missed |
| Cross-default to bank debt | Cross-class trigger | Bank default can occur without bondholders gaining a seat |
Key point
Worked example — Pelham Holdings 7.5% senior unsecured notes due 2031. Reading the indenture by purpose: (1) Leverage — 5.0x debt / EBITDA ceiling, tested quarterly, with carve-outs for working-capital revolver draws. (2) Priority — negative pledge present but with a $200M permitted-indebtedness basket that may be drawn to secured lenders without consent. (3) Shareholder leakage — restricted payments capped at 50% of cumulative net income plus a $150M starter basket. (4) Performance — none. (5) Cross-default — to bank debt only above $50M acceleration. Practitioner read: Pelham's bondholders are protected on leverage (5.0x is generous but real), partially on priority (the $200M basket is the structural hole), well on shareholder leakage, and not at all on performance. If PFAS regulation forces $200M of incremental secured DIP-style financing, the basket is exhausted and the bond's effective seniority erodes overnight.
Formula
Key point
Keep the instruments straight, because the covenant grammar differs. High-yield BOND indentures carry INCURRENCE covenants by construction — the borrower is only tested when it acts (borrows new debt, pays a restricted dividend); there is no quarterly compliance certificate, and there never was. MAINTENANCE covenants — quarterly leverage or coverage tests the borrower must pass continuously — live in LOAN credit agreements, and 'covenant-lite' is specifically a LOAN term: the large 2017-2024 leveraged-loan vintages that dropped their maintenance tests, leaving loans with bond-style incurrence packages. Middle-market direct lending and distressed-exchange paper still carry real maintenance tests and tighter baskets. In principle weaker protection should price wider; in practice cov-lite became the market standard with only a thin, regime-dependent premium — which is itself the lesson about what covenant protection is worth in a hot market.
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Tirebridge Materials issues new high-yield senior unsecured notes. The indenture contains a maintenance leverage covenant (4.5x debt / EBITDA ceiling) and a restricted-payments covenant capping dividends and buybacks at 50% of cumulative net income. Negative pledge, performance covenants, and interest-coverage tests are all absent. Which conclusion best describes what the bondholder bought?