| Term | What It Means | Who It Protects |
|---|---|---|
| Liquidation preference | Investors get their money back first in any exit | Investors — downside protection |
| Anti-dilution | Adjusts price if future rounds are at lower valuation | Investors — protection against down rounds |
| Board seats | Voting control at the board level | Depends on allocation — key control term |
| Pro-rata rights | Right to invest in future rounds to maintain ownership % | Investors — maintain exposure to winners |
| Drag-along | Majority can force minority to sell in an acquisition | Investors — prevents holdouts from blocking exits |
| Vesting | Founder shares vest over 4 years with 1-year cliff | Company/investors — prevents founder walkaway |
Liquidation preference is the most impactful term. A 1x non-participating preference means investors get their money back OR convert to common — fair. A 2x participating preference means they get 2x their money PLUS their pro-rata share of remaining proceeds — heavily investor-favored.
Going Deeper — dilution math through Series A → B → C. A founder starts at 100% pre-financing. Series A: VC invests $5M at $20M post-money — the founder is diluted to $15M / $20M = 75%. Series B: a new investor leads with $10M at $50M post-money — every existing holder is diluted by the new-money fraction $10M / $50M = 20%, so the founder goes to 75% × (1 − 0.20) = 60%. Series C: $20M at $100M post-money — dilution factor $20M / $100M = 20%, founder lands at 60% × 0.80 = 48%. Under conventional terms, the founder owns slightly less than half after three rounds. The discipline: model the cap table forward to the round you expect to exit at, including option-pool refreshes (which dilute everyone before the new money enters), and only then judge whether the founder's ownership economics still incentivize the work that matters.
Sit with the ideas.
A VC invested $25M at a $100M post-money (25% ownership) with 1x participating preferred. The company sells for $80M. How much does the VC receive?